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I. INTRODUCTION
Waiver of the right to pursue arbitration presents a paradox. Courts are
loathe to allow parties to play "fast and loose '1 by changing their positions in
the proceeding according to the "exigencies of the moment."'2 Yet, there
exists a strong federal3 and state4 policy in favor of arbitration. Generally,
courts resolve doubts concerning the scope of, arbitration in favor of
arbitration.5 This holds true regardless of whether the issue is the
construction of the contract language itself or a defense to arbitrability, such
as an allegation of waiver or delay.6
The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine recently addressed this paradox in
Saga Communications of New England, Inc. v. Voornas.7 While recognizing
the strong policy in favor of arbitration, the court tipped the balance in favor
of waiver in certain situations. At a minimum, the court held that where a
party utilizes the judicial system to attempt to resolve the dispute, it could not
*756 A.2d 954 (Me. 2000).
Selected Risks Ins. Co. v. Kobelinski, 421 F. Supp. 431,434 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
2 United States v. McCaskey, 9 F.3d 368, 378 (5th Cir. 1993).
3 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)-(b) (1994 & Supp. 2000) (creating a presumption of validity of
arbitration awards).
4 United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987) ("[T]hat a
court is convinced [the arbitrator] committed serious error does not suffice to overturn his
decision."); J.M. Huber Corp. v. Main-Erbauer, Inc., 493 A.2d 1048, 1050 (Me. 1985);
Westbrook Sch. Comm. v. Westbrook Teachers Ass'n, 404 A.2d 204, 207-08 (Me.
1979); Council of Smaller Enter. v. Gates, McDonald & Co., 687 N.E.2d 1352, 1356
(Ohio 1998) (quoting AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of America,
475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986), which stated that "in deciding whether the parties have agreed
to submit a particular grievance to arbitration, a court is not to rule on the potential merits
of the underlying claims."); Summit Co. Bd. of Mental Retardation & Dev. Disabilities v.
Am. Fed'n of State, County and Mun. Employees, 530 N.E.2d 962, 964 (Ohio Ct. App.
1988) (quoting Misco, 484 U.S. at 37-38, which stated that "[b]ecause the parties have
contracted to have disputes settled by an arbitrator chosen by them rather than by a judge,
it is the arbitrator's view of the facts and of the meaning of the contract that they have
agreed to accept.").
5 Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1983).
6 1d. at 24-25.
7 Saga Communications of New England, Inc. v. Vooras, 756 A.2d 954 (Me.
2000).
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escape the consequences of that decision by trying to enforce the arbitration
provision. 8
I. THE FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE CASE
In 1996, Lori Voomas signed a three-year contract of employment as an
on-air radio announcer and co-host of the morning show broadcast by Saga's
radio station WMGX in Portland, Maine.9 Voornas declined to renew her
contract when it came up for renewal in the summer of 1999, and she instead
decided to leave her employment with Saga on August 31, 1999.10 Voornas'
departure triggered a noncompetition provision in her 1996 employment
contract. The noncompetition provision precluded Voornas for a period of six
months from performing services as an on-air announcer for any competing
radio station, 11 either in format or targeted audience, in a 75-mile radius. 12
Not long after her departure from Saga and well before the expiration of
her noncompetition provision,13 Voornas began employment with Citadel
Communications Corporation (hereinafter Citadel). 14 Citadel owns several
radio stations in Portland that compete with Saga and WMGX, some of
which were listed in the noncompetition agreement. 15 Although Voornas did
not immediately return to the air, she undertook general promotional
activities for Citadel. 16
In October of 1999, Saga learned about Voornas' employment with
Citadel, and it commenced legal action against her.17 In addition to filing its
complaint, Saga moved the court for a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction. 18 Although Saga initially sought injunctive relief for
the alleged breach of the noncompetition agreement, it amended its
complaint to add a second count alleging misappropriation of trade secrets.19
8 Id. at 962.
9 Id. at 956.
10 d.
11 The parties attached a list of competing stations to the 1996 employment contract,
although the noncompetition agreement applied to any competing station whether it was
listed or not. Id.
12 Id.
13 The noncompetition provision was due to expire on March 1, 2000. Id.
14Id.
15 Id. at 956 n.2.
16 Id. at 957.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
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The day after Saga amended its complaint, Voornas moved the court to
dismiss the claim and filed her opposition to Saga's motion for injunctive
relief.20 Pursuant to a hearing, the trial court-finding that Saga failed to
show a likelihood of success on the merits and that it would be irreparably
harmed absent an injunction-denied Saga's motion for injunctive relief.21
Ten days after the hearing, Voornas moved for summary judgment.22 Of
critical importance, Saga answered Voomas' motion on the merits.23 Saga
also requested the trial court to grant summary judgment in its favor against
Voornas. 24
On December 20, 1999, Voornas appeared on-air for Citadel's station,
WCLZ.2 5 Saga immediately filed a motion for a temporary restraining order
and preliminary injunction, which the court denied because Saga failed to
show irreparable harm.26 At this point, Saga demanded for the first time that
Voornas voluntarily submit their dispute to arbitration in accordance with the
noncompetition provision in the 1996 employment contract.27
Voornas refused to submit to voluntary arbitration, and Saga filed
another expedited motion, seeking to stay the proceedings and compel
arbitration pursuant to title 14, section 5928 of the Maine Revised Statutes. 28
The trial court denied Saga's motion, and Saga appealed from the order
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id. Saga also filed a notice of deposition for Voomas, and the deposition was
scheduled for December 27, 1999. Id.
25 Id. WCLZ is now WPNT. The station was listed in Voomas' noncompetition
agreement with Saga. Id.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id. Section 5928 provides that court shall-on application of a party showing an
agreement and the opposing party's refusal to arbitrate--"order the parties to proceed
with arbitration." ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 5928(1) (West 1994 & Supp. 2000).
Section 5928 further provides as follows:
Any action or proceeding involving an issue subject to arbitration shall be stayed, if
an order for arbitration or an application therefor has been made under this section
or, if the issue is severable, the stay may be with respect thereto only. When the
application is made in such action or proceeding, the order for arbitration shall
include such stay.
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 5928(4) (West 1994 & Supp. 2000). If the opposing party
denies the existence of the agreement to arbitrate, the court shall "proceed summarily to
the determination of the issue so raised and shall order arbitration if found for the moving
party, otherwise, the application shall be denied." Saga, 756 A.2d at 957.
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denying its application to compel arbitration. 29 The Supreme Judicial Court
of Maine held that Saga waived arbitration, and it affirmed the lower court's
holding.30
JI. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE WAIVER DOCTRINE
An equitable principle, waiver is the "voluntary relinquishment or
abandonment-express or implied-of a legal right or advantage."' 31 It is
axiomatic, perhaps, that a party may not take inconsistent positions within
the same proceeding. 32 This is especially true where the party is acting with
knowledge of its rights.33
A. Waiver Generally
Courts have repeatedly held that when a party has two remedies
inconsistent with each other, any decisive act by the party determines its
election of the chosen remedy.34 In essence, a party waives its legal right
when it unilaterally acts contra to that right.35 The Supreme Court of
Michigan best put it in 1875:
A man may not take contradictory positions, and where he has a right
to choose one of two modes of redress, and the two are so. inconsistent that
the assertion of one involves the negation or repudiation of the other, his
deliberate and settled choice of one, with knowledge, or the means of
knowledge of such facts as would authorize a resort to each, will preclude
him thereafter from going back and electing again.36
29 Saga, 756 A.2d at 957. Saga appealed pursuant to section 5945(I)(A), which
provides that "[a]n appeal may be taken from: [a]n order denying an application to
compel arbitration made under section 5928." ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 5945(1)(A)
(West 1994 & Supp. 2000).
30 Saga, 756 A.2d at 961.
31 BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1574 (7th ed. 1999).
32 Rob v. Vos, 155 U.S. 13 (1894).
33 Equitable Trust Co. of New York v. Connecticut Brass & Mfg. Corp., 290 F. 712,
725 (2d Cir. 1923).
34 Id. at 725 (holding that "when a party has two remedies inconsistent with each
other, any decisive act by him, done with the knowledge of his rights and of the facts,
determines once and for all his election of the remedy.").
35 Coleman Production Credit Ass'n v. Mahan, 168 S.W.2d 903, 904 (Texas Civ.
App. 1943) (addressing the unilateral attributes of waiver).
36 Thompson v. Howard, 31 Mich. 309, 312 (1875).
440
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B. Waiver of Contractual Right to Pursue Arbitration
There is nothing extraordinary about waiver of the right to pursue
arbitration. Created in contract, the right to arbitration can be waived.37 An
equitable doctrine, waiver has been embedded in American jurisprudence for
a long time.38 In judicial proceedings, litigants waive their right to defenses
of lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue, insufficiency of process, or
insufficiency of service of process. 39 The arduous question, however, is who
has the authority to hold that a party has waived its right to arbitration: the
trial court or the arbitration panel?40
On the federal level, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held in Doctor's Ass'n, v. Distajo (Distajo 1), 41 that district courts
have the power to decide the question of whether a party has waived its right
to arbitration. 42 Further, courts have mostly confronted situations where a
defendant who, deep into the litigation process, tries to stay the judicial
37 See generally 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1994 & Supp. 2000). Section 3 states as follows:
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States
upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such
arbitration, the court in which such suit is'pending, upon being satisfied that the
issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an
agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until
such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement,
providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such
arbitration.
Id. (emphasis added); see Cornell & Co. v. Barber & Ross Co., 360 F.2d 512, 513 (D.C.
Cir. 1966) (per curiam) ("[Tihe right to arbitration, like any other contract right, can be
waived. A party waives his right to arbitrate when he actively participates in a lawsuit or
takes other action inconsistent with that right.").
3 8 See supra Part II.A.
39 FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1) ("A defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person,
improper venue, insufficiency of process, or insufficiency of service of process is waived
(A) if omitted from a motion.., or (B) if it is neither made by motion under this rule nor
included in a responsive pleading or an amendment thereof permitted by Rule 15(a) to be
made as a matter of course.").
40 After all, the court has the power to review the arbitration award once rendered,
and if the court believes that the arbitration panel has exceeded its authority, it may
vacate the award. Davidson v. Bucklew, 629 N.E.2d 456, 458 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992),
jurisdictional motion allowed, 609 N.E.2d 172 (Ohio 1993), appeal dismissed as
improvidently allowed, 626 N.E.2d 684 (Ohio 1994) (holding that a court will not
interfere with arbitration proceedings even if the issue to be arbitrated is improper as any
action taken by the arbitration panel would be reviewable by the common pleas court
when either a vacation or confirmation is sought).
41 Doctor's Ass'n v. Distajo (Distajo 1), 66 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 1995).
42 Id. at 456.
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proceedings under Section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).43 The
Second Circuit recognized that waiver is also applicable where the plaintiff
tries to stay the judicial proceedings. 44
In a sense, arbitrators do not have the authority to decide issues, which
the parties did not submit to arbitration under their agreement.45 Further, if
arbitrators exceed their authority, the court is empowered to vacate their
award.46 The question arises, then whether the parties, at time of contract
formation, intended the arbitrators to have the power to decide the issue of
waiver.47 However, it has long been accepted, at least in a collective
bargaining situation, that an arbitrator has the "inherent power" to determine
the sufficiency of the cause,48 and derivatively waiver.
Generally, a party waives its right to pursue arbitration when it (1)
engages in "protracted litigation"49 that results in (2) prejudice to the
opposing party. 50 For instance, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit held in Radiator Specialty Co. v. Cannon Mills, Inc.,51 that a
defendant waives their right to arbitrate by engaging in litigation at length.52
43 Id. at 455; 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1994 & Supp. 2000).
44 Distajo 1, 66 F.3d at 455; Saga, 756 A.2d at 961.
45 State Farm Mut. Ins. v. Blevins, 551 N.E.2d 955, 957 (Ohio 1990).
46 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.10(D) (West 1994 & Supp. 2000).
47 For instance, if the parties failed to empower the arbitration panel at the time of
contract formation to decide the issue of prejudgment interest, it is left to the court to
decide. Automated Tracking Sys. v. Great American Ins. Co., 719 N.E.2d 1036, 1042
(Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (reviewing with approval the trial court's deferral of a ruling on a
motion for prejudgment interest until after it had ruled on an application to confirm an
arbitration award). But see Luby v. Safeco Ins. Co., No. 52874, 1987 WL 19250, at *2
(Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 29, 1987) (holding that a party may not avail itself of the civil
proceedings to confirm an arbitration award once its has been satisfied).
48 Bd. of Trustees v. Fraternal Order of Police, 690 N.E.2d 1262, 1264 (Ohio 1988).
The court quoted Arbitrator Burton B. Turkus as follows:
In the absence of contract language expressly prohibiting the exercise of such
power, the arbitrator by virtue of his authority and duty to fairly and finally settle
and adjust (decide) the dispute before him, has the inherent power to determine the
sufficiency of the cause and the reasonableness of the penalty imposed.
FAIRWEATHER'S PRACTICE & PROCEDURE IN LABOR ARBITRATION 327 (Ray J.
Schoonhoven ed. 3d ed. 1991), quoted in Bd. of Trustees, 690 N.E.2d at 1264.
49 Kramer v. Hammond, 943 F.2d 176, 179 (2d Cir. 1991).
50 See Cotton v. Slone, 4 F.3d 176, 179 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Kramer, 943 F.2d 176,
179 (2d Cir. 1991)); accord Doctor's Ass'n v. Distajo (Distajo 11), 107 F.3d 126, 131 (2d
Cir. 1997).
51 97 F.2d 318 (4th Cir. 1938).
52 1d. at 319.
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IV. SAGA'S TREATMENT OF WAIvER
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court recognized the strong federal policy
in favor of arbitration, but it concluded that the arbitration-friendly policy
was "not intended to provide litigants with successive opportunities to
prevail through continued revisitation of the same issue in different
forums. '53 This is especially true, the court emphasized, when the party
demanding arbitration is "running from an unfavorable result in the courts."54
A. Power to Rule on Waiver: Trial Judges v. Arbitrators
By holding that Saga waived its right to arbitration,55 the Supreme
Judicial Court of Maine seems to have adopted the Second Circuit's holding
in Distajo L56 Although not explicitly holding so, the court seems to also
have held that Maine's state courts now have the power to determine whether
a party has waived its right to arbitration. Instead of simply deferring the
matter to arbitration, and then reviewing the arbitration panel's final
decision, Maine's state courts now have the power to stay arbitration
proceedings on grounds of waiver.
B. Prejudice
The Saga court did not answer the question whether prejudice is
necessary to determine waiver because it was "unable to agree with Saga that
Voornas has not been prejudiced." 57 Further, the court did not allocate the
burden of proof in the scenario that prejudice is necessary to determine
waiver. Whereas the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
holds that the commencement of the litigation process triggers a rebuttable
5 3 Saga, 756 A.2d at 962.
54Id.
55 Id.
56 Distajo 1, 66 F.3d at 456.
57 Saga, 956 A.2d at 961 ("[I]t is unnecessary in the present case to determine
whether waiver could be found even absent prejudice as we are unable to agree with Saga
that Voornas has not been prejudiced.").
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presumption of waiver,58 the majority of federal courts require a
demonstration of prejudice as the sine qua non of waiver. 59
Tacitly, the court adopted the Second Circuit's definition of prejudice,
which is the "inherent unfairness-in terms of delay, expense, or damage to a
party's legal position-that occurs when the party's opponent forces it to
litigate an issue and later seek to arbitrate the same issue."60 Further, the
court emphasized that the "proper focus" in determining the existence of
prejudice is on the "effect" of the delay upon the party opposing arbitration. 61
V. RES JUDICATA, RES ARBiTICATA, AND RES ARB-JUDICATA 2
Saga purely dealt with the situation where the party itself waives its right
to arbitration.63 The question arises, however, whether the natural
progression of Saga is the application of the entirety of the doctrine of res
judicata to arbitration. Res judicata operates as a "complete bar to any
subsequent action on the same claim or cause of action between the parties or
those in privity with them." 64 Privity in the context of res judicata is
"somewhat amorphous" 65 and does not require either a contractual or a
58 Cabinetree of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Kraftmaid Cabinetry, Inc., 50 F.3d 388, 390-91
(7th Cir. 1995) (holding that the commencement of the litigation process creates a
rebuttable presumption of waiver of arbitration).
59 Menorah Ins. Co. v. INX Reinsurance Corp., 72 F.3d 218, 221 (1st Cir. 1995);
Leadertex, Inc. v. Morgantown Dyeing & Finishing Corp., 67 F.3d 20, 25 (2d Cir. 1995);
Morewitz v. West of England Ship Owners Mut. Protection & Immunity Ass'n, 62 F.3d
1356, 1366 (11th Cir. 1995); Hoffman Constr. Co. of Oregon v. Active Erectors &
Installers, Inc., 969 F.2d 796, 798 (9th Cir. 1992); Fraser v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc., 817 F.2d 250, 252 (4th Cir. 1987); Lawrence v. Comprehensive Business
Serv. Co., 833 F.2d 1159, 1164-65 (5th Cir. 1987).
60 Doctor's Ass'n v. Distajo (Distajo I1), 107 F.3d 126, 134 (2d Cir. 1997), quoted in
Saga, 756 A.2d at 961.
61 Saga, 756 A.2d at 961. The court concurred with the Eastern District of New
York's holding in American Express Fin. Advisors, Inc. v. Zito, 45 F. Supp. 2d 230, 234
(E.D.N.Y. 1999) and Navieros lnter-Americanos, S.A. v. M/V Vasilia Express, 120 F.3d
304, 316 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding that a month delay is long and prejudicial in expedited
cases). Id.
62 Res arbiticata and res arb-judicata are terms created by the author of this recent
development note. The author uses res arbiticata to denote the waiver of arbitration
through a prior act in arbitration, and res arb-judicata to denote the waiver of arbitration
through an act in court, like the situation in Saga.
63 Saga, 756 A.2d at 954.
64 Brown v. Dayton, 730 N.E.2d 958, 961 (Ohio 2000) (quoting Johnson's Island,
Inc. v. Danbury Twp. Bd. of Trustees, 431 N.E.2d 672, 674 (Ohio 1982)).
65 Id. at 962.
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beneficiary relationship.66 Instead, mutuality of interest, which includes the
identity of the desired result, creates privity.67
The court has not yet answered the question of whether a party's right to
pursue arbitration may be waived by those in privity with it. The aftermath of
Saga is likely to deal with two questions: (1) whether a party's right to
pursue arbitration can be waived through the prior acts of a party in privity in
an arbitration (res arbiticata), and (2) whether it can be waived through the
party in privity's act in court (res arb-judicata). The jury is still out on these
questions. However, if history is any guide, it appears that courts will apply
the entirety of the resjudicata doctrine to arbitration.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the aftermath of Saga, a party may still seek an injunctive relief in
appropriate circumstances without jeopardizing its right to arbitrate.
However, if the litigation addresses substantive arbitrable issues, the party
interested in arbitration should be careful and. aware that it is walking a fine
line that may waive its right to later pursue arbitration.
The more important aspect of Saga is the jurisdictional question. Courts
have the power to review an arbitration award once rendered, and they can
vacate an award in certain circumstances. Another approach for the Maine
Supreme Judicial Court would have been to simply add waiver as one of the
grounds for vacating an arbitration award. Instead, the court went further by
tacitly empowering the state trial courts to stay arbitration proceedings on the
grounds of waiver. In brief, litigants beware!
Majeed George Makhlouf
66 One may reasonably conclude that the Ohio Supreme Court's amorphous
definition of privity in Brown only applies to privity between plaintiffs and not privity
between defendants. In Brown, the plaintiffs challenged the validity of a city ordinance
that was unsuccessfully challenged in a previous action. The court held that resjudicata
bars the new plaintiffs from relitigating the validity of the ordinance as the plaintiffs in
both cases refer to themselves as "residents and taxpayers of the city of Dayton" and
"their legal interests are the same." Id. at 962. However, the court did not explicitly
restrict the extent of its holding to privity between plaintiffs. Id
67 Id.; accord Grava v. Parkman Twp., 653 N.E.2d 226, 229 (Ohio 1995) (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 25 (1982) in holding that resjudicata applies
to "extinguish a claim by the plaintiff against the defendant even though the plaintiff is
prepared in the second action (1) [t]o present evidence or grounds or theories of the case
not presented in the first action, or (2) [t]o seek remedies or forms of relief not demanded
in the first action.").

